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Williams v. French
146 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1998)
I. Facts
Larry Darnell Williams ("Williams") spent the night of June 2, 1979, drink-
ing alcohol, smoking marijuana, and ingesting Valium with Linda Massey
("Massey', her cousin Darryl Brawley ('Brawley'), and an unidentified male.'
The group of four, using a car borrowed from another cousin of Massey, left
Charlotte, North Carolina, and drove to Gastonia, North Carolina, where they
proceeded to "case" a service station where the victim, Eric Joines, ('joines")
was on duty.2 After driving by the station several times, the group stopped at the
station where Williams, carrying a 2 0-gauge sawed-off shotgun, and the unidenti-
fied male went to the booth where Joines was working and robbed him.3 Wil-
liams then shot Joines and the two men returned to the vehicle.4 The group
continued on to Concord, North Carolina, where they stopped at a. convenience
store.' Williams and the unidentified male exited the vehicle and entered the
store. Once inside, Williams shot the clerk, Susan Verle Pierce ("Pierce'), and,
together with the unidentified male, robbed the store.6
In June of 1980, Williams was tried and convicted in the Superior Court for
Gaston County, North Carolina, on the charges of first-degree murder and
armed robbery, arising out of the murder of Joines' During the sentencing
phase, the prosecution argued the existence of only one aggravating circum-
stance, that the murder of Joines was "part of a course of conduct in which
Williams engaged and which included the commission by Williams of other
crimes of violence against [Pierce]."' The jury found that the presence of this
aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances found by the
jury and recommended that Williams receive a death sentence.9 The trial court
1. State v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243, 248 (N.C. 1982). Massey and Brawley testified as to
these events at Wlliams's trial. The defense declined to present a case; accordingly, their testimony
constitutes the record on review. Wiliaams, 292 S.E.2d at 248.
2. Id
3. Id
4. Id Interestingly, neither the Supreme Court of North Carolina nor the Fourth Circuit
made an issue out of the omission of the identity or the role of this "unidentified" fourth party.
5. Wilrams, 292 S.E.2d at 248-49.
6. Id
7. Williams v. French, 146 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 1998).
8. Williams, 146 F.3d at 207.
9. Id The jury found seven characteristics of the defendant to constitute mitigating
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accepted the recommendation and sentenced Williams to death."°
After exhausting state remedies,11 Williams filed a federal habeas petition in
the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
alleging (1) the Public Defender's Office's representation of him was adversely
affected by a conflict of interest arising from their brief representation of Massey;,
(2) the grand jury foreman was chosen in a racially discriminatory fashion; (3) he
was sentenced to death without the requisite finding that he actually killedJoines,
had intended to kill Joines or was a major participant in the murder; (4) the trial
court improperly instructed the jury as to its consideration of mitigating circum-
stances; (5) the evidence presented at trial and sentencing required the submis-
sion of two statutory mitigating circumstances; (6) that defense counsel was
ineffective; (7) the judge's felony murder and "course of conduct" instructions
were unconstitutional; and (8) the trial court's exclusion of three prospective
jurors violated his constitutional rights. 2
The district court denied the habeas petition and Williams appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
II. Holdng
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, affirmed the
denial, finding all of Williams's claims to be without merit or to be defaulted
without the showing required to excuse default.' 3
III. Anaysis/Application in Virinia
A. Review of the Procedural Default Doctrine
With the exception of two claims, each of the claims raised by Williams was
found to be procedurally defaulted. 4 "Absent cause and actual prejudice or a
miscarriage of justice, a federal habeas court may not review constitutional claims
when a state court has declined to consider their merits on the basis of an
adequate and independent state rule.""5 The state rule is considered "adequate"
if it is "regularly or consistently applied" and is "independent" if it does not
circumstances: (1) lack of criminal history; (2) age of twenty-four; (3) positive employment history;
(4) voluntary submission to drug treatment program; (5) good reputation; (6) considerate and loving
brother and son; and (7) considerate and loving father. Three characteristics were not found to be
mitigating circumstances: (1) Williams's IQ of sixty-nine; (2) evidence that Williams had acted
appropriately in connection with a civil claim; and (3) other circumstances worthy of mitigating
value. Id at n. 3.
10. Id at 207.
11. Each of the claims raised in this appeal, save two, was found to be procedurally defaulted
in state court. See, discussion of procedural default, infra, notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
12. Id at 210-18.
13. Wilams, 146 F.3d at 208-18.
14. Id at 208.
15. Id at 208-09 (footnote and citations omitted).
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require reliance on a federal constitutional ruling. 6 When the finding is based
upon an adequate and independent state rule, a reviewing federal court does not
have the power to question a state court's use of the procedural rule. 7 Accord-
ingly, the reviewing court may only excuse a procedural default ruling for reason
of cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.'" Factual findings of the state
court are given a "presumption of correctness" when reviewed for cause to
excuse procedural default.' Factors that constitute cause" include: official
interference such that it makes compliance with rule "impracticable;" a showing
that the legal or factual basis for the claim was not "reasonably available;" the
novelty of the claim; and constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.2'
The North Carolina courts found the majority of Williams's claims to be
procedurally defaulted under section 15A-1419(a)(3) of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes.2 Because Williams did not present the argument that the circuit
court's refusal to address these procedurally defaulted claims would result in a
miscarriage of justice, the court of appeals considered only whether cause and
prejudice had been shown to excuse the defaults.'
16. Id at 209. See alsoJohnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (discussing the "adequacy"
requirement of the state rule); & Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (defining an "independent"
state rule).
17. Wilams, 146 F.3d at 209. See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989).
18. Wilams, 146 F.3d at 208-09.
19. Id at 209.
20. The court did not entertain the question of what constitutes a miscarriage of justice since
this argument was not advanced by Williams. Id at n.6.
21. Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
22. The statute reads in pertinent part "(a) The following are grounds for the denial of a
motion for appropriate relief, including motions fded in capital cases: ... (3) Upon a previous
appeal the defendant was in a position to adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present
motion but did not do so." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419(a)(3) (1997).
23. The court of appeals found several of Williams's claims to be procedurally defaulted.
First, the Fourth Circuit disposed of Williams's equal protection jury claim by reasoning that
although Williams raised as an equal protection claim to the selection of the grand jury foreman,
Williams stipulated to lack of intentional discrimination as required to sustain an equal protection
claim. The court did not specifically discuss the argument based on Sixth Amendment "fair cross-
section" grounds. Second, the court of appeals rejected Williams's claim that he was sentenced to
death absent the requisite finding of intent required by Enmundv. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). The
Fourth Circuit found, for the first time, that Williams had the intent required by Enmunad despite
the fact that there is no precedent authorizing a federal court to relieve the state court of this
burden. See also Case Note on Hopkins v. Reeves, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 53 (1998). Next, the court of
appeals rejected Williams's claim that. the jury instructions were inadequate under McKoy v. North
Carolna, 494 U.S. 433 (1990)(striking down the '-'explicit unanimity instruction on mitigating
circumstances") McKoy is inapplicable to the Virginia sentencing structure. Finally, the Fourth
Circuit found that Williams's argument that the jury instructions for felony murder and "course of
conduct" were unconstitutional and Wflliams's claim that the trial court unconstitutionally permitted
the recusal of prospective jurors were also procedurally defaulted.
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B. Conflict of Interest
The court turned first to Williams's claim that the Public Defender's Office
inadequately represented his interests due to their brief representation of Massey.
Arguing the existence of cause and prejudice, Williams claimed that the factual
or legal basis for this claim was not available to him on direct appeal.24
The Public Defender's Office was appointed to represent Williams at his
initial appearance on June 12,1979.25 Following an initial interview of Williams
by an investigator associated with the office, the same investigator accompanied
a public defender not assigned to Williams's case to the Gastonia Police Depart-
ment to meet with Massey, who had not yet been charged with her association
in the murder of Joines or Pierce. Massey made a statement to the representa-
tives of the Public Defender's Office that implicated the defendant as having a
role in the crimes.2 6 That afternoon, Massey was charged as an accessory after
the fact to the murder ofJoines and the Public Defender's Office was appointed
to represent her.27 The following morning, the court granted the public de-
fender's motion to withdraw his appointment to represent Massey.
28
The conflict of interest issue was not argued on direct appeal. The court
found that "there was no state law barrier preventing Williams from raising a
conflict of interest claim" and "the essential facts underlying the claim were
known or should have been known by... Williams's counsel."'  The court al.o
concluded that, in the event that cause had been established, Williams would be
unable to demonstrate prejudice.3"
Williams's conflict of interest claim suggests the need for steps to be taken
by public defenders and other defense firms to avoid conflict of interest in the
representation of their clients. Some suggestions to help guard against these
situations include: (1) refusing to accept co-defendants in capital cases; (2) estab-
24. Williams, 146 F.3d at 210.
25. Id at 211.
26. Id
27. Id
28. Wiliams, 146 F.3d at 211.
29. Id at 211-12. See also Case Note on King v. Greene, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 117 (1998).
30. WilMams, 146 F.3d at 212. This conclusion was reached after a de novo review of the
record in which the court determined that any existing conflict did not adversely affected counsel's
performance. In order to show a conflict of interest, the defendant need not show prejudice in the
sense of a possibility that but-for the conflict there might have been a different outcome. However,
it is necessary that the defendant demonstrate that the conflict of interest adversely affected
counsel's performance in some way. If this showing is made, prejudice to the defendant is
presumed. Williams was unable, in the court's view, to make this showing. Id at 212-13. The most
troubling aspect of the court's finding that Williams had not demonstrated an adverse affect arising
from the conflict was the claim that it prevented effective cross-examination of Massey at trial
concerning statements she made about the violent propensities of one Larry Currus. See id at 211.
Though the connection is not made directly in the opinion, it is highly probable that Currus was the
unidentified fourth person who accompanied Williams into both convenience stores. In a capital
case, particularly, this raises questions of relative culpability.
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lishing and maintaining a system to ensure that attorneys know other clients
represented by the office in a criminal capacity; and (3) establishing and maintain-
ing an office procedure to allow for the expedient removal of an attorney from
a case where a potential conflict of interest manifests itself.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
1. Failure to Submit Mitigating Circumstances
Williams claimed that the evidence presented at trial and sentencing necessi-
tated the submission to the jury of the following two statutory mitigating circum-
stances under the North Carolina General Statutes: (1) crime committed under the
influence of mental disturbance 31 and (2) the defendant lacked the capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his actions.32 Williams attempted to excuse proce-
dural default by claiming that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request
their submission.33 The Fourth Circuit determined this decision to have been of
a tactical nature, in light of the circumstances.' Apparently, the reports did not
convince trial counsel that there was enough evidence to pursue the mitigating
factors and counsel elected instead to stipulate Williams's I.Q. of sixty-nine."
This choice did not violate any principles of representation but the I.Q. of sixty-
nine suggests the substantial need to develop mental retardation evidence in order
to relate it to the offense at issue. Stipulation to the number is not nearly enough
as evidenced by the fact that the jury did not find Williams's I.Q. a mitigating
factor.
2. Failure to Investigate Witness Statements
During Williams's trial, an investigator for the Public Defender's Office
interviewed four inmates: John Poag, Bernard Taylor, Marvin Ledbetter, and
MichaelJohnson.36 These men were prepared to testify that Darryl Brawley had
not witnessed Williams rob or shoot anyone. Williams alleged that the failure
of defense counsel to investigate the statements of these potential witnesses con-
stituted ineffective assistance of counsel.3 The court determined that the claim
had been procedurally defaulted when it was not raised on direct appeal and,
further, that Williams would not be able to establish prejudice to excuse proce-
dural default.39 The court said the fact that defense counsel had "extensively
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(0(2) (1997).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(0(6) (1997).




37. Williams, 146 F.3d at 217. Darryl Brawley and Linda Massey were the two main witnesses
against Williams at trial. Id at 206.
38. Id at 218.
39. Id at 217-18.
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cross-examined" Brawley during the guilt phase of the trial rendered sufficient
a conclusion that "any impeachment value derived from the fourwitnesses would
have been cumulative at best."4
The court assumes arguendo that this failure was unreasonable representation
but excuses it on the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington.4' However, the
court does so in a semantically questionable manner. The Fourth Circuit notes
that counsel "extensively cross-examined Brawley" but does not indicate whether
the cross-examination had to do with statements made by Poag to Brawley.42
Every effort must be made, of course, to discover and use evidence to impeach
the credibility of Commonwealth witnesses.4' There is no way for counsel, how-
ever, to control the Fourth Circuit's forgiving interpretation of the standards of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Alix Marie Karl
40. Id at 218.
41. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
42. Wilams, 146 F.3d at 218.
43. See Case Note on Stricklerv. Praett, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 145 (1998).
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